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Distinguishing Bundles from Sticks: Determining 
Denominators in Regulatory Takings Cases Involving 
Severed Mineral Rights
DENOMINATOR DELIRIUM: TREATMENT OF SEVERED MINERAL RIGHTS 
BY LOWER COURTS
In 1992, a district court in Kansas held that a lessee of an oil and gas 
interest who the state prohibited from drilling did not have a compensable 
takings claim because a country club’s surface rights on the same tract of 
land owned by a country club still had value.1 The Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation” when the government takes 
private property for public use; but courts are split over how to define the 
relevant property, which affects the calculation for compensation in takings 
cases.2 This difference of interpretation is as problematic for governments 
opening themselves up to takings liability by passing regulations aimed at 
bettering society as it is for property owners trying to anticipate the viability 
of their potential takings claims against governments for those regulations. 
Defining the property at issue accurately is critical to a regulatory taking 
claim’s success or failure. Defining it narrowly enough will almost always 
result in the finding of a taking, whereas defining it too broadly will mean 
that a taking will almost never occur.3
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the first in a line of cases that 
comprise the so-called regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court 
held that regulations on exercising mineral rights could be so onerous that 
they create compensable takings, in spite of valid governmental interests 
for regulating mineral activity.4 Courts evaluate regulatory takings claims 
using a conceptual fraction of the value lost by regulation, in which the 
numerator is the loss in value of the affected property and the denominator 
is the original value of the parcel against which courts weigh the loss in 
value.5 If regulation strips all or almost all of the value from the relevant 
                                                                                                        
Copyright 2019, by MICHAEL HEATON.
1. Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792 F. Supp. 1205, 1214 (D. Kan. 1992).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. U.S., 
568 U.S. 23 (2012). But see Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. U.S., 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); see Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Kan. 1992).
3. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory 
Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1994). 
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 
(1967).
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parcel, whatever a court determines that to be, the State owes the owner of 
that parcel compensation.6 In other words, courts use the fraction of the 
value lost by regulation to determine whether government action was so 
burdensome as to require compensation under the Takings Clause.
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts should not 
view separately owned mineral and surface rights—rights “severed” from 
one another—together as one denominator.7 Viewing such separately held 
rights as a single denominator would allow courts to consider all possible 
surface uses in a takings analysis, despite the fact that an owner of 
separately held mineral rights is only able to use the surface to the extent 
necessary to explore and extract minerals.8 Under this single denominator 
analysis, a district court in Kansas held that an owner of severed mineral 
rights who the state had prohibited from drilling did not have a 
compensable takings claim because surface rights on the same tract that 
someone else owned still had value.9 This analysis, while consistent with 
a doctrinal aversion to viewing the destruction of a single strand in the 
proverbial “bundle of rights”10 that comprise ownership of property as a 
compensable taking,11 is nonetheless troubling for owners of severed
mineral rights that would have no chance at receiving compensation for 
burdensome regulations that still allow for alternative surface uses.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case establishing the current 
predominant regulatory takings framework, cautioned against dividing 
parcels into distinct property interests for the denominator analysis.12 The 
Court has since upheld a merger of two adjacent tracts of land owned by 
the same person, emphasizing the Court’s hostility toward dividing 
potential denominators to increase takings liability.13 Despite the Court’s 
hesitance to accept dividing parcels up for denominator analyses in those 
cases, the Court should recognize severed mineral rights as separate 
denominators. This conclusion is appropriate because, regardless of 
whether a jurisdiction conceptualizes mineral interests in a rights-based 
manner like Louisiana or an ownership-based manner like Texas, an owner 
                                                                                                        
6. Id. at 1232-33.
7. Whitney Benefits, Inc., 926 F.2d, at 1172.
8. Id.
9. Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. at 1214. 
10. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992). Property 
is commonly described as “bundle of sticks” or rights that make up ownership, 
with each interest in the property representing a single strand in the bundle. United 
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 274 (2002).
11. Fee, supra note 3, at 1558.
12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
13. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
2019] COMMENT 555
of separately held mineral rights cannot exercise all the uses of the 
property that the owner of the surface rights can.14
Part I of this Comment provides background on the regulatory takings 
doctrine and discusses the way courts tend to frame these issues. Part II of 
this Comment juxtaposes ownership of mineral rights in Texas, a common 
law jurisdiction, with ownership of such rights in Louisiana, a civilian 
jurisdiction, and highlights the practical implications of these differing 
approaches. Part III examines the history of the regulatory takings doctrine 
and discusses the relevance and effects of the denominator analysis on 
takings claims. Part IV focuses on the recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin
and its potential ramifications on denominator and regulatory takings 
analyses. Reading this case broadly, the Court settled the question of 
horizontal severance in the regulatory takings doctrine; but Murr may not 
have as much doctrinal weight as some scholars believe. Part V
demonstrates the inapplicability of Murr’s acceptance of a merger of 
adjacent lots united under common ownership to situations in which 
different individuals own the mineral and surface rights in a single tract. 
Part V also develops a more logical way to conceptualize the denominator 
problem in these situations. In light of this analysis, courts should view 
severed mineral rights as their own denominators.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
While courts have traditionally recognized takings when a 
government actually seizes property, compensable takings can also arise 
from situations in which regulation so burdens property that it effectively 
seizes it.15 In other words, regulations can limit a property’s use so much 
that courts deem states to have seized the property for the purposes of 
compensability under the Takings Clause. This idea has evolved into a 
complex doctrine of “regulatory takings.” Lower courts appear to have 
difficulty consistently determining compensability of regulatory takings 
of severed mineral rights,16 but a straightforward application of the 
principles at the core of the doctrine suggests that such takings are indeed 
compensable.
                                                                                                        
14. Annotation, Severance of title or rights to oil and gas in place from title 
to surface, 146 A.L.R. 880 (2017).
15. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
16. See Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. at 1214; see also Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d 
at 1172.
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A. The Traditional Bundle of Sticks
Scholars commonly describe property using the metaphor of a bundle 
of sticks, with all the sticks representing individual rights; and it has 
traditionally been the role of state law to determine which sticks compose
the bundle.17 If state property law sufficiently protects an economic 
interest in property, courts may compel others to compensate owners if 
they interfere with it.18 When a person owns a tract of land, she typically 
also owns the rights to minerals that exist underground in her tract of 
land.19 In these situations, the right to produce minerals is just one stick in 
the traditional bundle of rights.20 This is not so with respect to separately 
held mineral rights.
B. Dueling Perspectives on the Takings Clause
In spite of the Takings Clause’s broadly prohibitive language, there is 
an interpretive split over how broadly to construe the clause. The Fifth 
Amendment provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”21 When a government effectively seizes 
private property for public use, it owes the former property-holder 
compensation. Comporting with this traditional view of the Takings 
Clause, Chief Justice Roberts once described the clause “as a barrier 
between individuals and the press of the public interest.”22 While this 
notion of the Takings Clause certainly finds support in the doctrine, other 
interpretations abound.
Opinions as to the proper role of the Takings Clause in the protection 
of private property widely vary. One approach uses a broad reading of the 
Takings Clause, operating under the assumption that the Framers generally 
opposed efforts to redistribute wealth.23 The Takings Clause, then, “states 
a principle that the government pays for what it takes,” suggesting that 
compensation under the Takings Clause is an inevitability, rather than the 
                                                                                                        
17. Craft, 535 U.S. at 274.
18. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
19. See generally NANCY SAINT-PAUL, History of property interest in land—
Oil and gas, in 1A SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 8:10 (3d ed. 2017).
20. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 500–01 (1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
23. Benjamin Allee, Comment, Drawing the Line in Regulatory Takings 
Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the 
Denominator Problem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 1995 (2002).
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fact-intensive analysis of value lost that exists in most cases, particularly 
in regulatory takings cases.24 However, scholars do not universally accept 
the historical underpinnings of this philosophy.25 On the contrary, more 
detailed accounts of the Constitution’s drafting reveal that the Framers 
intended the Takings Clause to have a much narrower scope.26
Additionally, there are those who believe that the Fifth Amendment, 
and by extension the Supreme Court of the United States, should not 
protect property rights.27 Instead, those holding this view assert that this 
task should fall to state courts and state legislatures, which should protect 
these rights by defining them clearly.28 The Court’s role, then, “is to figure 
out some means whereby the broad and capacious terms of the clause are 
narrowed, so as to remove the constraint that it imposes on the actions of 
federal and state governments.”29 While judges and justices seldom accept 
this narrower view of the Takings Clause in traditional takings cases, they 
tend to do so with respect to regulatory takings cases.
C. Regulatory Takings as an Outgrowth of the Narrower View
The Court construes the Takings Clause as having a narrower reach 
with respect to regulatory takings than it does for traditional takings cases, 
in the sense that fewer cases result in compensability.30 Originalists, like 
Justice Thomas, explain this difference in approach by arguing that
regulatory takings were never intended to fall within the ambit of 
compensability under the Takings Clause.31 Although Justice Thomas’ 
view is extreme, as it implies the erroneousness of an entire doctrine, it 
underscores a hostility toward compensating property owners for smaller-
scale takings that pervades regulatory takings jurisprudence.32
                                                                                                        
24. Fee, supra note 3, at 1553.
25. Allee, supra note 23, at 1995.
26. Id.
27. Rick Hills, A Half-Hearted Two Cheers for the Victory of Federalism 
over Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin (June 23, 2017), PRAWFSBLAWG,
https://perma.cc/DN7Y-RUFB.
28. Id.
29. Richard A. Epstein, Will the Supreme Court Clean Up Takings Law in 
Murr v. Wisconsin?, 11.1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 860, 862 (2017).
30. See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings 
Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014).
31. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. See Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)); see also Penn Cent. 
Transp. 438 U.S. 104.
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A stark difference in the protection of property affected by burdensome 
regulation, as opposed to property seized in a more conventional way, is the 
rationale set forth in the “Armstrong principle.” This principle states that the 
Takings Clause in the regulatory takings context is meant “to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”33 The 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on “fairness and justice” and “public burdens” 
seems more emblematic of substantive due process analyses than traditional 
takings analyses.34 Reading this sort of balancing of interests into the takings 
analysis complicates what is an otherwise straightforward question of 
whether some governmental action reached the level of a seizure of private 
property. 
The owner-centric, fairness-focused language of the Armstrong
principle, on its face, seems incompatible with the property-focused, 
broadly prohibitive language of the Takings Clause.35 The fact that fairness 
enters the calculus at all might favor a narrower view of the Takings Clause 
in the regulatory takings context, since it precludes compensability where 
the fairness rationale would not apply. In spite of this potential narrowing 
effect, the Armstrong principle militates in favor of compensating owners of 
separately held mineral rights because it would be unfair to force owners of 
such rights to lose a higher proportion of the value of their property than 
owners of mineral rights and surface rights without compensation.
Some scholars urge the Court to eliminate the division between 
physical and regulatory takings altogether, replacing this formalistic 
distinction with a rule that requires the government to compensate private 
owners for all losses—no matter their magnitude or the property rights 
with which they are associated—any time the government does not have 
traditional police power justifications for regulation.36 While a bright-line 
rule like this would certainly make the regulatory takings analysis less 
complicated and easier to predict, the likelihood of the Court adopting this 
sort of rule is very slim, especially in light of the current state of the 
doctrine, since adopting it would require a much broader view of the 
Takings Clause. This sort of bright-line rule would also expose the 
government to crippling financial liability any time it did something that 
interfered with property interests.
While the Court has not adopted the preceding bright-line rule, it has 
adopted some bright-line rules that simplify regulatory takings analyses in 
                                                                                                        
33. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
34. Eagle, supra note 30, at 614.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 29, at 875.
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some cases. One such rule is the Lucas “per se takings” test, which stands
for the proposition that the State owes compensation any time it deprives 
property of all economically viable use, unless the State had prohibited the 
use at the time the owner acquired title.37 If property owners do not satisfy 
the requirements of the per se rule, they are at the mercy of courts weighing 
and balancing various factors, including those set forth in Penn Central v. 
City of New York and, as of June 2017, Murr v. Wisconsin.38
Penn Central requires inquiry into the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action to determine whether a compensable taking occurred.39
Murr v. Wisconsin states that the denominator analysis depends on: the 
treatment of the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics 
of the land, the prospective value of the regulated land, and background 
customs and the whole of our legal tradition.40 Whether under Lucas or Penn 
Central, though, the denominator problem still exists because applying the 
denominator analysis to determine the property at issue necessarily precedes 
using the takings analysis to determine how the challenged regulation 
impacted that property.
D. Distinguishing Bundles from Sticks
In determining whether the State owes compensation, the Court has 
calculated the value lost by regulation using a conceptual fraction in which 
the numerator is the loss in value of the affected property.41 The pre-
regulation value of the parcel against which courts will weigh the loss in 
value is the “denominator” in a regulatory takings case.42 If the proportion 
of the value destroyed as compared to the relevant denominator is all or 
nearly all, the State owes compensation.43 This means that the government 
will owe compensation when its regulations strip a property of all or nearly 
all of its value.
For the purposes of the Takings Clause, courts sometimes treat 
intangible property rights, like mineral rights, as property and sometimes 
                                                                                                        
37. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
39. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
40. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
41. Michelman, supra note 5, at 1192.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1232–33.
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do not, which makes it difficult to predict outcomes in particular cases.44
This lack of clarity in the jurisprudence makes it challenging for property 
owners to discern denominators on their own. Determining the 
denominator in the context of a regulatory takings case is especially 
difficult because the Court has repeatedly held that the takings analysis 
must use the “parcel as a whole” as the denominator without clearly 
articulating what comprises that parcel.45 For instance, it is unclear 
whether separately held mineral rights should constitute merely one stick 
in the traditional bundle, thus making the denominator both the mineral 
rights and the surface rights owned by someone else. 
Courts might just as easily construe separately held mineral rights as 
bundles, and thus denominators, unto themselves. In fact, treating 
separately held mineral rights as denominators apart from the surface 
rights owned by someone else makes sense in light of the separately held
nature of these rights.46 Conceptualizing the denominator accurately is 
critical to the success or failure of a takings claim because defining it 
narrowly enough will almost always result in the finding of a taking, 
whereas defining it too broadly will mean that a regulatory taking will 
almost never occur.47
For example, if surface rights are a part of the denominator in a case 
involving separately held mineral rights, such a takings claim will be 
significantly less likely to succeed because the court would consider 
alternative surface uses that have value although the owner of separately 
held mineral rights could not exercise any of these uses. Using this analysis 
to preclude compensability of regulatory takings claims by owners of 
separately held mineral rights violates the Armstrong principle and seems 
at odds with the core principles of the regulatory takings doctrine. Thus, 
the appropriate denominator in regulatory takings cases involving 
separately held minerals rights is those rights themselves, and not those 
rights in combination with separately held surface rights.
                                                                                                        
44. Andrew Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory 
Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 578 (2003).
45. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
46. To be clear, the author is not discounting the policy reasons that favor 
striking down a claim of a regulatory taking of severed mineral rights on the 
merits. See generally Kevin J. Lynch, Regulation of Fracking is Not a Taking of 
Private Property, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 39 (2016). The author is merely arguing, as 
a threshold matter, that the proper denominator in such a case is the severed 
mineral rights, not these rights and the surface rights.
47. Fee, supra note 3, at 1536. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING MINERAL RIGHTS
Determining whether separately held mineral rights constitute all or 
merely part of the denominator in a regulatory takings action requires 
examination of the essence of these rights. The nature of mineral rights in 
Louisiana, a civilian jurisdiction, is different from the nature of these rights 
in Texas, a common law jurisdiction; and these differing approaches could 
impact regulatory takings analyses. While all states have developed their 
own bodies of mineral law, Louisiana’s and Texas’ disparate treatments 
of mineral rights are noteworthy, not only because they highlight the 
distinction between civilian and common law treatment of these rights but 
also because of these states’ reputations for being rich in minerals.48
A. Louisiana’s Treatment of Mineral Rights
In the absence of controlling provisions in the Civil Code or special 
legislation, Louisiana courts created rules for mineral rights by 
analogizing to disparate provisions in the Civil Code.49 In 1920, in Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs et al., the Louisiana Supreme Court 
began to clarify the nature of mineral rights in Louisiana by explicitly 
rejecting “dismemberment of the so-called mineral estate from the so-
called surface estate.”50 This view of separate estates remains the common 
law rule today, but this common law notion of estates has never been part 
of Louisiana law.51 Instead, Louisiana has used a more rights-based 
conception of mineral rights.
In 1974, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Mineral Code as a 
supplement to the Civil Code in order to clarify the state’s mineral law.52
The legislature has seldom amended the Mineral Code.53 Under the 
Louisiana Mineral Code, ownership of land does not necessarily include 
ownership of oil, gas, and other liquid or gaseous minerals.54 The 
                                                                                                        
48. See Paul Ausick & Michael B. Sauter, The 10 most oil-rich states, USA
TODAY (Aug. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/LZ87-28Q9.
49. Patrick S. Ottinger, From the Courts to the Code: The Origin and 
Development of the Law of Louisiana on Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. &
RESOURCES 5, 16 (2012).
50. Id. at 24; See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs et al., 91 So. 
207 (1920).
51. Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana Texas Oil & Gas Law: 
An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 782–83 (1992).
52. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1 et seq. (2017).
53. Ottinger, supra note 49, at 40.
54. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2017).
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landowner does, however, have the exclusive right to explore and develop 
her property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to 
possession and ownership.55 Therefore, in spite of the fact that a Louisiana 
mineral rights holder does not “own” the minerals in her property in place, 
she nevertheless has comparable rights to the minerals as someone in an 
ownership-based jurisdiction, like Texas. In contrast to the common law 
notion of “estates,” under Louisiana’s Civil Code, everything is subject to 
absolute ownership; and things like mineral rights are burdens or charges 
on absolute ownership.56 Louisiana defines mineral rights as incorporeal 
immovables that are alienable and heritable.57
B. Texas’ Treatment of Mineral Rights
Texas, for the most part, follows the traditional common law theory of 
mineral and surface estates that are conceptually distinct from one another 
and thus severable.58 In Texas, mineral estate holders have executive and 
leasing rights, the right to explore and develop, and the right to receive 
royalties and other payments.59 The ownership-in-place doctrine, 
predominant in Texas, asserts that the holder of a mineral right owns the oil 
and gas in the ground even though no one actually possesses it until they 
bring it to the surface.60 Through this doctrine, Texas courts have come up 
with one way to facilitate severance of mineral estates from surface estates 
and have encouraged exploitation of underground reservoirs of oil, gas, and 
groundwater.61
Vertically severing62 mineral estates from surface estates creates 
problems for owners of severed mineral estates, particularly when they 
                                                                                                        
55. Id.
56. Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 784.
57. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:18 (2017). “Alienable and heritable” here means that 
the mineral rights may be conceptually separated from the land and sold or 
inherited as something apart from the land itself. See Hornsby v. Slade, 854 So. 
2d 441, 445–46 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
58. See Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas 
Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings 
Challenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349 (2007).
59. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (1986).
60. Dayna Ferebee, Comment, Handshakes and Heartaches: Who Owns the 
Oil After Rogers v. Ricane?, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 129, 138 (1995).
61. Riley, supra note 58, at 358.
62. As will be addressed in greater detail in Part V, while the Court is 
generally unfriendly to any form of so-called conceptual severance, it is possible 
to sever property for takings analyses vertically—into mineral, surface, and air 
rights—or horizontally along lot lines. See Darren Botello-Samson, The 
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want to access or use the surface. Often, the owners of the mineral estate 
have no ownership rights in the surface estate.63 Texas resolves this issue 
by recognizing an implied easement to conduct mineral activity and by 
clearly defining responsibilities between severed surface and mineral 
estate owners.64 Without such an implied easement, owners of severed 
mineral estates would be in the awkward position of having no means of 
exercising the rights to the minerals in the ground they purchased.
These rules and others like them “are predicated on a fundamental 
truism in Texas: the mineral estate is dominant over the surface.”65 This 
means that the mineral estate owner can exercise her rights over the 
objection of the surface estate owner, allowing her to do whatever is 
reasonably necessary to exercise those rights.66 Of course, while the mineral 
estate owner does have access to the surface to facilitate production, the law 
recognizes that this surface access is not completely unlimited.67
C. Comparing the Louisiana and Texas Approaches
Some scholars suggest the Mineral Code owes at least some credit to 
Texas cases for many of its provisions, referencing comments to the Mineral 
Code articles that borrow standards from Texas precedent.68 For example, 
as mentioned briefly above, Louisiana mineral rights are alienable and 
heritable, meaning previous owners can transfer them to new owners, in 
much the same way owners can transfer a severed mineral estate under 
Texas law.69
In Louisiana, when a landowner sells off the ability to produce minerals 
on her land, she is granting a mineral servitude, which is a “right of 
enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and 
producing minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”70 This 
is one of the above-mentioned burdens or charges on absolute ownership
that Louisiana recognizes.71 While Texas landowners own the minerals 
                                                                                                        
Benchmark of Expectations: Regulatory Takings and Surface Coal Mining, 22 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2008).
63. Riley, supra note 58, at 358.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners—What Happens 
When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D. L. REV. 41, 68 (1987).
68. Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 779.
69. See Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445-46; see LA. REV. STAT. § 31:18 (2017).
70. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2017).
71. See Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 784.
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themselves through the ownership-in-place theory, Louisiana landowners 
have the “right to produce” the minerals on their property.72 In Louisiana, 
landowners cannot create and sell a separate estate for the minerals on their 
property, but they can sell off their right to produce those minerals.73
D. A Distinction without a Difference?
Under Texas’ ownership-in-place theory, under which the landowner 
owns the “fee” to oil, landowners can sever oil and gas in place from the 
surface.74 Nevertheless, courts can reach similar results under rights-based 
theories like Louisiana’s where owners can grant rights to all the production 
of oil from a property to someone other than the owner of the surface.75
Under both theories, the practical effect is the same: landowners can transfer 
all of the mineral rights usually belonging to them to someone else.76 There 
are certainly conceptual differences between civil and common law 
treatment of mineral rights, and there are plenty of differences in treatment 
of minerals from state to state. No matter what theory of ownership a state 
has or how a particular state conceptualizes mineral rights, the holder of 
those rights does not also have access to all potential surface uses. Thus, the 
denominator calculation, and, by relation, the regulatory takings analysis, 
should remain the same.77
III. TREATMENT OF REGULATORY TAKINGS: ANALYSIS UNDER A 
SHIFTING DOCTRINE
The regulatory takings doctrine is still relatively young, as it only 
began to develop around 1922.78 The current factor-based analysis of 
regulatory takings did not develop until 1978.79 As will become clear, 
however, this test is not the beginning and end of every regulatory takings 
analysis, as it has numerous exceptions and modifications that apply to 
                                                                                                        
72. Id. at 803.
73. Id. at 804.
74. Annotation, Severance of title or rights to oil and gas in place from title 
to surface, 146 A.L.R. 880 (2017).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1172. If, however, a state treated mineral 
rights as completely non-severable from surface rights, courts would have no 
choice but to conclude that mineral rights and surface rights should be viewed 
together as a single denominator.
78. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
79. See Penn. Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. 104.
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specific circumstances. The Court’s latest gloss on the denominator 
analysis that precedes an analysis of compensability of regulatory takings 
came in the summer of 2017.80
A. The Doctrine in its Infancy
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated a statute which prohibited miners from extracting sub-surface 
coal that supported surface-level buildings owned by someone else by 
classifying it as a regulatory taking. The Court explained that it did not 
“see that the fact that [such surface owners’] risk has become a danger 
warrants giving to them greater rights than they bought.”81 In 
Pennsylvania Coal, the coal company that filed the takings claim only had 
rights to the minerals, not to the surface, because they sold the surface 
before the statute’s enactment.82 This was the first case to afford protection 
under the Takings Clause to owners of severed mineral rights, and many
legal scholars see Justice Holmes’ opinion in this case as the beginning of 
the regulatory takings doctrine.83
Justice Brandeis’ lone dissent in Pennsylvania Coal demonstrates that, 
from the inception of regulatory takings jurisprudence, there was 
disagreement about how best to determine the relevant parcel in cases 
concerning separately held mineral rights.84 Justice Holmes appeared to 
address only the value of the affected coal.85 Justice Brandeis, on the other 
hand, argued that the Court should consider the value of the “whole 
property” because the sum of the rights in parts of property, surface and 
subsoil, cannot be greater than the rights associated with the whole.86
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81. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
82. Id. at 412.
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Justice Brandeis’ ad coelum87 conception of property, which would 
consider the surface as well as the subsurface in the takings analysis,88
makes sense when the owner of the mineral rights also owns the surface 
rights. However, this treatment of property makes no sense in the context 
of separately held mineral rights because it increases the parcel considered 
as the denominator, thus reducing the likelihood of compensability, by 
considering uses outside the control of the owner of the mineral rights.89
Justice Holmes’ notion of the denominator as only the mineral rights in 
regulatory takings cases concerning separately held mineral rights is more 
logical than an alternative theory that would reduce the likelihood of 
takings by considering uses of the surface outside the control of the owner 
of the mineral rights.
B. Penn Central and its Impact
The next watershed for the regulatory takings doctrine was the 
development of the factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City.90 New York City adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law 
(LPL) in 1965 to protect and enhance its landmarks and historic districts.91
Final designation as a landmark under this law resulted in land use 
restrictions.92 The City designated Penn Central Terminal as a landmark 
under the LPL and designated the city tax block as a landmark site.93 Penn 
Central entered into a contract with UGP Properties for UGP to build a 
multistory office building on top of the terminal, but the Commission 
rejected certificates for this proposed development.94 None of Penn 
Central’s attempts to secure judicial relief in New York state courts were 
successful, so it appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.95
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The Court established the current regulatory takings analysis96 by
identifying the following factors for determining such takings from 
jurisprudence at the time: the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
action.97 The application of this factor test and the way that courts have 
weighed each factor has varied greatly. Legal scholar Steven J. Eagle98
believes that the Penn Central inquiry also implicitly included a fourth 
factor, the “parcel as a whole,” which was another concept discussed in the 
opinion.99 The “parcel as a whole” is essentially shorthand for the 
denominator in these cases; so Eagle, by identifying this as a fourth factor, 
acknowledges that the denominator analysis and the takings compensability 
analysis are intertwined. Because these analyses are related, how courts 
determine the denominator in a case involving separately held mineral rights 
is critical to whether such a claim will be compensable.
C. After Penn Central: Bright-Line Bonanza
As mentioned above, courts have varied in their applications and 
balancing of the Penn Central factors. As Eagle points out, since Penn 
Central, courts have “patched its flaws with [other] increasingly complex 
tests.”100 The Court has issued a number of decisions interpreting the scope 
of the Takings Clause that have provided sparse guidance by supplying 
some categorical rules; but these decisions have also muddied the doctrine 
with additional considerations. 
While Penn Central is the primary test for the compensability of 
regulatory takings, other factors and cases continue to influence the 
doctrine.101 In fact, the Court sometimes evades the Penn Central analysis 
altogether by relying on one of the bright-line rules the court has 
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developed to supplement the Penn Central analysis.102 Since critics have 
attacked the Penn Central test as vague, the Court might be relying on 
additional rules to bolster the regulatory takings doctrine with some bright-
line rules. By developing exceptions to the Penn Central framework, the 
doctrine may appear more predictable; but the limited scope of these 
bright-line rules necessarily means they cannot clarify the entire doctrine. 
The exceptions and additions to the Penn Central analysis are myriad, 
which also allows courts to be inconsistent in their application of these 
additional considerations.103
One such exception to the Penn Central analysis came from Lucas, in 
which the Court held that, if the loss of property use resulting from a 
regulation is equal to the sum of all usage rights in a piece of property, a 
compensable taking has occurred.104 Lucas does come with a significant 
caveat: the government may deny compensation if “the proscribed use 
interests were not a part of [the owner’s] title to begin with.”105 In some 
cases, this means that if regulations were in place at the time the owner 
acquired the property, the owner has no means of challenging them as 
takings because the uses fall outside the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations prong of Penn Central.106 The Court itself pointed out in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island that this principle of denying takings where the 
owner was on notice of the regulation at the time of purchase should not 
be taken too far. In that case, the Court warned that states should not be 
allowed to “put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” by passing 
legislation that would progressively restrict uses after subsequent changes 
in ownership.107
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, which 
challenged a Pennsylvania statute limiting coal mining at such a level as 
to undermine support of surface-level properties, the Court expressed 
“hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of property 
that are tantamount to public nuisances.”108 The Court upheld the statute 
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107. 533 U.S. at 627 (2001). Of course, where a landowner attempts to 
increase takings liability by severing her property into smaller pieces that will 
experience intensified economic impacts under regulatory burdens, compensation 
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in Keystone while nevertheless declining to invalidate the earlier 
Pennsylvania Coal decision that struck down a similar statute.109 In so 
doing, the Court relied on an established “public nuisance exception” to 
the compensability of takings, which generally states that the state has 
power to regulate private property for health and general welfare purposes 
even where the regulation deprives the property of all its value.110
The Court distinguished Keystone from the earlier case, positing that
Keystone dealt with public interests, whereas, in Pennsylvania Coal, the 
Kohler Act served only private interests because it was more tailored to a
specific situation.111 The Court explained that the Kohler Act was meant 
for the sole protection of surface owners who had released their rights to 
the subsurface, whereas the legislation at issue in Keystone more generally 
protected society from unsafe mining practices.112 The takeaway from 
Keystone is that statutes that merely prohibit mining at levels that will 
likely lead to subsidence or other dangers to surface owners will likely not 
lead to compensable takings. The Court reached this conclusion without 
clearly describing the proper denominator for cases involving separately 
held mineral rights, finding that the statute fell within the categorical 
“public nuisance” exception.113 The various bright-line exceptions to Penn 
Central and to the general principle of compensability of regulatory 
takings produce mixed results for owners of separately held mineral rights.
In an ownership-in-place jurisdiction like Texas or a rights-based 
jurisdiction like Louisiana, regulation of mineral rights can lead to 
compensable takings under Penn Central or possibly even under Lucas,
because both jurisdictions recognize the possibility of separately held 
mineral rights. Under both theories of ownership, though, if state property 
law changes to outlaw this possibility, regulation of mineral rights would 
be less likely to lead to compensable takings under Penn Central and 
would almost certainly not lead to compensable takings under Lucas.
Additionally, if the purpose of regulation is to protect the public from an 
unacceptable risk of harm, the regulation would fit squarely in the public 
nuisance exception to compensability articulated in Keystone and thus not 
lead to a compensable taking.
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IV. MURR V. WISCONSIN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In the summer of 2017, the Court published its opinion in Murr v. 
Wisconsin, its latest interpretation of the regulatory takings doctrine.114
Murr does not replace Penn Central but is rather another example of the 
aforementioned factor tests designed to fill gaps in the Penn Central 
factors.115 In particular, it is designed to address and better articulate what 
constitutes the denominator in a case involving adjacent lots owned by the 
same person.116 Before this case, most courts entertained “at least a strong 
presumption” that contiguous land united under common ownership 
should comprise a single parcel for a takings analysis.117 This presumption 
is now much closer to black-letter law because of the Court’s decision in 
Murr.
A. The Facts of Murr
The Murrs purchased a small lot in 1960 and built a small cabin on 
it.118 In 1961, they transferred the lot to the family plumbing company.119
In 1963, they purchased the neighboring lot in their own names.120 The 
Murrs later transferred the lots, one at a time in 1994 and 1995, to their 
children.121 At this time, a county ordinance, which prohibited the 
individual development or sale of adjacent lots united under common 
ownership unless they made up at least an acre measured together or 
separately, merged the lots.122 The Murrs asked for variances from the St. 
Croix County Board of Adjustment to allow them to move the cabin to a 
different portion of the lot it was on and sell the other lot to fund this move; 
and the Board denied their requests.123 The Murrs then brought suit 
challenging the merger ordinance as a regulatory taking.124
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B. The Majority’s Analysis: New Factors for the Denominator 
Determination
The Court tweaked the regulatory takings analysis by identifying 
factors to “determine whether reasonable expectations about property 
ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would 
be treated as one parcel or as separate tracts.”125 These factors determine 
the proper denominator in regulatory takings cases dealing with multiple 
adjacent tracts of land. Murr sets forth the following factors: the treatment 
of the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the 
land, the prospective value of the regulated land, and background customs 
and the whole of our legal tradition.126
These factors make sense in the context of the facts in Murr but will be 
difficult to apply to cases that deviate from these particular facts. 
Additionally, if reasonable expectations actually do guide the factors, and 
thus the denominator analysis, separately held mineral rights should 
certainly constitute denominators apart from the surface rights. Considering 
reasonable expectations, it is unlikely that owners of severed mineral rights 
would reasonably expect such rights to be viewed in conjunction with 
surface rights over which they have no legal authority.
C. Criticism of the New Factors from the Bench
The Justices on the Court were not all on board with the majority’s 
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts penned a dissent in Murr that Justices 
Thomas and Alito joined.127 Justice Roberts argued that the majority’s 
departure from previously settled deference to state property rules 
“authorize[d] governments to do precisely what [the Court] rejected in Penn 
Central: create a litigation-specific definition of ‘property’ designed for a 
claim under the Takings Clause.”128 He went on to say that such a departure 
from deference to state law property regimes “compromises the Takings 
Clause as a barrier between individuals and the press of the public 
interest.”129 This retreat from using state law definitions of property to 
determine denominators is worrisome for private landowners across the 
United States, as it creates the possibility of fewer compensable takings, but 
should perhaps be less so to individuals who own only the rights to minerals.
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Justice Thomas filed his own dissent in Murr, in which he
recommended that the Court should reexamine its regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, “to see whether it can be grounded in the original public 
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”130 Justice Thomas 
suggested that Pennsylvania Coal and its progeny, and thus the entire 
regulatory takings doctrine, were out of step with the understanding at the 
time that the Takings Clause only provided compensation in cases of direct 
appropriation of property.131 This narrow scope of the Takings Clause would 
lead to substantially fewer compensable takings and would turn years of 
doctrine on its head.
While even Justice Thomas would likely agree that the Court 
invalidating an entire doctrine seems unrealistic, the dissents in Murr
demonstrate that there is still some hesitance by members of the Court to 
move away from deference to state definitions of property interests. Justice 
Roberts points out that the conclusion in any given case might be the same
but nevertheless argues that courts should not look to factors outside of state 
law to define the boundaries of parcels of land.132 State definitions of 
property interests should determine denominators, and courts should only 
use other factors to determine whether a compensable taking actually 
occurred.
D. Frontloading the Merits Analysis: The Impact of Murr
After the decision in Murr, there was a flurry of legal scholarship 
attempting to unpack its significance and potential impact on the regulatory 
takings doctrine. For some legal scholars, a case like Murr means relatively 
little because they believe that state governments, not the Fifth Amendment, 
should protect private property.133 Others believe the most effective strategy 
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of protecting property rights “combines litigation with political action, 
rather than relying on either exclusively.”134
The inherent flexibility of the regulatory takings doctrine made it 
somewhat difficult to determine denominators before Murr.135 The Court’s 
creation of additional factors certainly did not make the denominator 
analysis any easier.136 The majority’s approach also opens the door to 
strategic manipulation by landowners who will try to lessen their risk of 
uncompensated takings by avoiding placing contiguous lots under 
common ownership, and by the state, which will likewise attempt to 
manipulate the factors in the majority opinion to its own advantage.137
Murr might also make landowners prove a taking twice by double-
counting factors associated with a loss in value of the property, once to 
determine the appropriate denominator and again to determine whether a 
compensable taking occurred.138 This puts the question backward by 
emphasizing loss in value before determining the proper denominator.139
The front-loading of any valuations certainly gives the impression that the 
Court is setting the bar much higher for plaintiffs trying to prove 
regulatory takings than for plaintiffs claiming traditional takings. On the 
other hand, this may just be yet another outgrowth of the Court’s attempts
to constrain compensability of regulatory takings.
Some argue that Murr gives “undue attention to the needs of the 
government without giving due consideration to the notion of ‘property’ or 
the rights that inure to the ‘owner’ of property in the first instance.”140 As 
evidenced by the Court’s broad application of the so-called “public nuisance 
exception” to the compensability of takings in Keystone,141 the scales 
undoubtedly tip in the government’s favor when considering the 
compensability of a regulatory taking associated with potentially dangerous
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activities like producing minerals. At least one scholar has expressed 
concern that Murr might create an “exception for cases where the owner 
happens to own a lot next door.”142 Respectfully, while Murr is certainly 
troubling for owners of contiguous lots, factor tests like the one created in 
Murr do not create such categorical rules. Factual differences might lead to 
more landowner-friendly results in future cases. The reach of Murr is 
limited in that the factors favor different results in situations other than the 
specific facts of the case, such as cases involving separately held mineral 
rights.
V. APPLICATION OF MURR TO SEPARATELY HELD MINERAL RIGHTS AND 
A PATH FORWARD FOR THE DOCTRINE
Application of the factor test set forth in Murr favors treating 
separately held mineral rights as a distinct denominator. Under the factors 
identified as relevant by the Court, mineral rights owned by someone other 
than the owner of the surface rights should be viewed as an independent 
parcel for the purposes of the regulatory takings analysis.
A. The Murr Factors’ Application to Separately Held Mineral Rights 
If “reasonable expectations about property ownership”143 are what 
shape the majority’s factors in Murr, and thus the whole denominator 
analysis, the case for separately held mineral rights comprising a 
denominator apart from the surface rights is even stronger. It would be 
unreasonable for an owner of severed mineral rights to expect a court to 
define her property in conjunction with surface rights to which she has no 
legal claim for a takings analysis, especially in light of the ways states 
have created systems which favor, or at least promote, separate ownership 
of mineral rights.144
The first factor the Murr Court considers is the treatment of the parcels 
under state and local law.145 As highlighted in an earlier section of this 
Comment,146 whether using a rights-based or ownership-based theory of 
mineral rights, these rights are conceptually distinct from the underlying 
land because it is possible to sell one’s mineral rights without also selling 
other uses of the tract of land.147 Since these rights are susceptible of 
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separate ownership, and since states have gone to such great lengths to 
facilitate mineral production, it follows logically that mineral rights should 
constitute their own denominators and be compensable as separate parcels 
when they are owned by someone other than the landowner. 
The Court has expressed that, while states can pass reasonable land 
use regulations without effecting takings, states may not use regulation as 
an end-run around the Fifth Amendment by stripping more and more uses 
from property owners’ titles over time.148 Treating separately held mineral 
rights as part of a larger denominator includes uses to which the mineral 
rights-holder has no access in the consideration of what value is lost. This 
facilitates an erosion of the Takings Clause by allowing states to constantly 
fall back on the argument that there are other uses associated with the 
property, even if the holder of the mineral rights cannot exercise them. 
Especially in states like Texas, where mineral rights explicitly dominate 
over surface rights,149 courts should recognize such state efforts to protect 
the rights of mineral owners as militating in favor of viewing separately 
held mineral rights as separate denominators.
The second factor the Murr Court considers is the physical 
characteristics of the tracts, which include things like the physical 
relationship of distinguishable tracts, the topography, and the surrounding 
environment.150 The Court’s gloss on this factor in particular suggests that 
the Court is not trying to create a factor test with broad applicability across 
a range of potential denominator determinations. Some denominator 
analyses will necessarily require courts to make distinctions between 
theories of ownership rather than the physical composition of the property 
at issue. Applied in Murr by considering the range of the tracts’ alternative 
uses, this factor favors viewing separately held mineral rights as separate 
denominators because owners’ rights in these situations are so limited.
The third factor the Murr Court considers is the prospective value, 
which is calculated under the challenged regulation with special attention 
to the effect of the burdened land on the value of the other holdings.151 In 
applying this factor, the Court compared the value of the Murrs’ lots 
separately to the value of the lots together and arrived at the conclusion 
that, since the lots were worth significantly more valued together, they 
could also be viewed together for denominator purposes.152 The value of 
mineral rights together with surface rights would not likely be significantly 
higher than the respective values of these rights separately, so this factor 
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also seems to favor viewing separately held mineral rights as a separate 
denominator.
As articulated earlier in this Comment, collapsing considerations of 
value into the denominator analysis creates conceptual problems and may 
lead to double-counting of some of the factors traditionally associated with 
the question of whether there is a compensable taking in a particular 
case.153 The Court’s evolution of a complex, multi-faceted regulatory 
takings analysis has frustrated and confused lower courts, and even the 
Court itself has been inconsistent with its application of all the parts and
sub-parts of the analysis it created.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that, whatever its merit, the Murr
formulation does not settle all questions of conceptual severance, taking one 
stick from the proverbial bundle and treating it separately for the purposes 
of a takings analysis, in denominator problems.154 Instead, the factor test 
seems to only provide an answer to the horizontal severance issue—that is, 
creating multiple denominators by splitting distinguishable parcels up along 
lot lines—because this is the only situation for which the Court was 
examining “reasonable expectations about property ownership.”155 As 
demonstrated below, it is not even completely clear that Murr provides a 
firm answer on the question of whether this sort of conceptual severance is 
acceptable. 
B. What the Murr Analysis Leaves Unsettled
Many courts have failed to explicitly articulate their reasoning in 
particular regulatory takings cases, choosing instead to express 
conclusions without much indication of how they reached these results.156
These leaps in logic make regulatory determinations seem arbitrary and 
unpredictable.157 Compounding this problem is the fact that the Court 
allows multiple analyses for similar issues to co-exist, further muddying 
an already murky doctrine. For example, one Federal Circuit case,158
which came up through the courts at the same time as Murr, suggests that 
Murr did not completely settle the horizontal severance issue.159 The 
Federal Circuit concluded that the proper denominator in a case involving 
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the Corps of Engineers’ denial of a permit for development of a single 
parcel was that parcel alone and not that single parcel, an adjacent plat, 
and scattered wetlands also owned by the plaintiff.160 The fact that the 
Court did not hear this case together with Murr or vacate the decision and 
remand for consideration in light of Murr may mean that Murr does not 
have the weight that some assume it has.161
Even if the Court believes, in spite of the Court of Appeals case, that 
it settled the question of horizontal severance, the Murr factors certainly 
do not settle all questions of conceptual severance—the breaking apart of 
distinguishable property rights into multiple denominators. The issue of 
conceptual severance of mineral rights from surface rights, sometimes 
dubbed vertical severance, begs the question posed by scholar Frank 
Michelman: Why not recognize the distinction between mineral and 
surface rights and say “that the relevant denominator in testing a regulation 
which impinges only on mining rights or foundry rights is the value of 
those rights—which the regulation totally destroys?”162 While there are 
certainly flaws with this method of determining denominators in situations 
where the owner of the mineral rights is also owner of the surface rights, 
because this would be the sort of strategic division of denominators the 
Court cautioned against in Penn Central,163 it seems appropriate to frame 
denominators this way for situations involving severed mineral rights.
C. The Possibility of a Lucas Total Taking
A footnote164 in the Court’s opinion in Lucas—which, as previously 
discussed, stood for the principle that the government owed compensation 
when it deprived property of all economically viable uses165—sheds some 
light on the question of how to determine denominators in regulatory takings 
cases. The Court states that the answer to the question of how to define the 
denominator “may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been 
shaped by the State’s law of property,” in other words, to what degree state 
property law has afforded protection for individual interests in the 
property.166 As previously discussed, whether in a rights-based system like 
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Louisiana or an ownership-based system like Texas, state property law has 
afforded mineral rights a great deal of protection.167
Scholars like Patrick C. McGinley168 argue that the Lucas categorical 
takings rule should be limited to claims of owners of both mineral and 
surface rights, thus precluding such a claim where the denominator is only 
mineral rights.169 McGinley argues that the holding of Lucas does not 
require the application of the categorical rule to future cases involving less 
than full ownership and leaves unresolved the potential application of the 
categorical rule to separately held mineral rights.170 While the Supreme 
Court expressed hesitation in whole-heartedly endorsing this footnote in 
Murr, it nonetheless explained how the Murr decision was consistent with 
the deference to state law expressed in Lucas. This discussion indicates 
that the footnote is at least worth considering.171
Also, Keystone is not conclusive on the denominator issue, which is 
critical in determining whether to apply the Penn Central or the Lucas
standard.172 If courts expressly prohibited applying conceptual severance 
to separately held mineral rights, which they do not, there would be no 
possibility of a Lucas total taking, which would put the plaintiff in the 
somewhat trickier position of having to prove a taking using the murky, 
value-based analysis set forth in Penn Central. Even if courts do not 
require the application of the Lucas categorical rule, they should apply it 
because of the Court’s consistently expressed deference, even in its weaker 
state in Murr, to state law protection of distinct property rights.
Under Louisiana’s rights-based or Texas’ ownership-based theory of 
mineral rights, there is a possibility of a Lucas total taking so long as the 
state does not expressly prohibit separate ownership of mineral rights. 
Owners of mineral rights in jurisdictions like Texas have a more 
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straightforward claim under this theory, because they will be asserting a 
taking of physical property, the minerals they own in place. Owners of 
mineral rights in jurisdictions like Louisiana can reach the same result by 
using the footnote in Lucas to demonstrate the Court’s potential acceptance 
of a taking of a property interest like an exclusive right to produce minerals. 
While owners of mineral rights in ownership-in-place jurisdictions like 
Texas will have an easier time demonstrating a Lucas total taking of their 
mineral rights, such a claim may also be successful in a rights-based 
jurisdiction like Louisiana.
D. Still protected by Penn Central?
Even relying exclusively on Penn Central, courts should still protect 
owners of separately held mineral rights by recognizing these rights as a 
denominator apart from the surface rights. The Murr majority did not offer 
any reason for precluding independent protection of divided interests 
when state law encourages such division.173 The case for protection of such 
interests is even stronger when the owner of the mineral rights does not 
also have the rights to all possible surface uses. One scholar argued that 
the regulatory taking inquiry should hinge on “whether the property 
interest proposed to have been taken is in fact substantial enough to 
warrant Fifth Amendment protection as an independent bundle of 
rights.”174 As previously discussed,175 states have afforded mineral rights 
a great deal of protection; and this approach would justify mineral rights 
comprising distinct denominators.176
In the realm of Penn Central, the denominator analysis is especially 
critical to determine whether a taking has occurred. The current analysis 
precludes an owner from claiming a taking where a regulation leaves some 
valuable uses of her property intact.177 Therefore, if the denominator 
includes surface uses even in situations involving separately held mineral 
rights, owners will almost always lose their takings claims because these 
surface uses will offset whatever loss in value things like moratoriums on 
drilling create. Some have suggested that, under Penn Central and 
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Keystone, courts should consider air, mineral, and surface rights as a single 
denominator regardless of severed ownership;178 but this would lead to 
some pretty absurd results, as the district court case in Kansas179 featured 
in the Introduction indicates. 
E. Penn Central Factors Analyzed for Severed Mineral Rights
A common-sense application of the Penn Central factors to separately 
held mineral rights as their own denominator can still lead to compensable 
takings. As previously mentioned,180 legal scholar Steven Eagle believes 
that the “parcel as a whole,” which has become shorthand for the 
denominator, is a fourth factor in these cases.181 An analysis of the Court’s 
three factors and Eagle’s fourth factor demonstrates the possibility of 
compensability in cases involving separately held mineral rights.
The first factor the Penn Central Court considers is the economic 
impact of the regulation, which, perhaps more than any of the majority’s 
other factors, is extremely fact-dependent.182 Here, if the government has 
regulated away all or nearly all the economically valuable uses, there is 
the added possibility of a Lucas total taking, as previously discussed.183 If, 
in the alternative, the government’s regulation merely impacts part of the 
value of the property, for instance if a drilling moratorium only affects part 
of the property and drilling is still possible elsewhere on the property, 
courts must weigh the rest of the factors to determine whether the 
governmental action is still a compensable taking.
The second factor the Penn Central Court analyzes is the investment-
backed expectations of the owner.184 In weighing this factor, the Court’s 
other cases provide some guidance. As previously mentioned,185 Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island stood for the proposition that reasonable land use 
regulations do not effect a taking but also made clear that states could not 
reduce property-owners’ rights just by regulating potential uses of land out 
of individuals’ titles over time.186 In weighing this factor, courts should 
certainly be cognizant of the fact that people who own severed mineral 
rights, or any mineral rights for that matter, should expect to be regulated 
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pretty heavily. However, courts should also be careful not to presume that 
such owners expected to lose all or nearly all of their rights.
The third factor the Penn Central Court considers is the character of 
government action.187 This factor is where the public nuisance exception, 
mentioned above relating to Keystone,188 comes in. The State is certainly 
free to prevent something as severe as subsidence, as in Keystone, but 
should not be free to pass protectionist legislation targeting private 
interests but declaring itself as connected to putative public interests, as in 
Pennsylvania Coal. Courts may have problems in drawing this distinction. 
In so doing, they should be especially careful not to apply cases like 
Keystone and Penn Central as bright-line rules militating against vertical 
or conceptual severance of property interests rather than the fact-sensitive, 
complex inquiries they are in reality.
Another concept the Penn Central Court discusses, treated here as a 
fourth factor, is the “parcel as a whole.”189 This concept essentially 
incorporates the denominator analysis into the analysis to determine the 
compensability of the action challenged as a taking. In regulatory takings 
cases involving separately held mineral rights, the “parcel as a whole” in 
an ownership-based jurisdiction like Texas or a rights-based jurisdiction 
like Louisiana should be only the severed mineral rights, not merely 
because this would be the only regulated property but also because this 
property is fundamentally distinct from the surface rights. Under either 
theory, viewing the severed mineral rights as the “parcel as a whole,” or 
denominator, is not dividing the parcel up to increase takings liability but 
is rather looking only to the parcel at issue without considering other 
parcels or property interests. Thus, an application of the Penn Central
factors can lead to a finding of compensability for a taking of separately 
held mineral rights.
CONCLUSION: A TIME AND PLACE FOR CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
Situations involving separately held mineral rights seem ripe for the 
theory of conceptual severance, since owners of such rights cannot use the 
surface of a property in all the ways surface owners can. Scholars have 
criticized the use of conceptual severance in situations where the property 
owner holds both the mineral and surface rights. Application of conceptual 
severance would allow such an owner to be compensated for something 
like a prohibition on drilling a gas well in spite of the fact that she would 
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still be able to put the surface to all manners of alternative uses.190
Conceptual severance is clearly inappropriate in this situation, because it 
would use only those rights affected by the regulation as the denominator. 
While the Court has generally rejected defining the denominator as 
only the rights or the part of the parcel affected by the regulation in 
question, it has nevertheless employed the theory of conceptual severance 
under certain circumstances to construe the denominator more narrowly 
and thus find a taking where there might not otherwise be one.191 Situations 
like ownership of separately held mineral rights, in which the owner does 
not also have access to alternative surface uses, cry out for this sort of 
analysis as a logical approach to prevent unduly harsh results.192 Without 
conceptual severance in these situations, plaintiffs who own only the 
mineral rights would be without compensation merely by virtue of the 
existence of alternative surface uses that they could not exercise.
While the Court has tried to curb the use of the conceptual severance 
doctrine, it has nonetheless been receptive to its application when value is 
tied to a single use which regulation prohibits, so long as no economic 
value remains through other uses.193 The very nature of separately held 
mineral rights implies that value is tied to a single use; so the Court should 
have no problem with conceptual severance in these situations. While 
Murr appears to be another instance in which the Court is disavowing or 
at least strongly disfavoring notions of conceptual severance for takings 
analyses, owners of separately held mineral rights still have valid takings 
claims where regulations place a moratorium on drilling but would still 
allow for other development. Their mineral rights would only allow them 
to use the surface to the extent necessary for their drilling and would also 
not give them rights to develop on the surface.
Asking a court to consider mineral rights as a separate denominator 
when the owner of the mineral rights also owns surface rights on the 
property is certainly the sort of division the Court was cautioning against. 
However, asking a court to do the same when all the owner has is the 
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mineral rights associated with a property does not pose the same risk.
Rather, this sort of conceptual severance makes sense and is in keeping 
with the Armstrong fairness principle, that the Government should not 
force “some people alone to bear public burdens which, in fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”194 at the heart of the 
regulatory takings doctrine. It would not be fair to force owners of 
separately held mineral rights to lose a higher proportion of the value of 
their property than other owners of mineral rights without any means by 
which they could recoup their losses.
The original animus behind the creation of the regulatory takings 
doctrine also militates in favor of treating separately held mineral rights as 
a separate denominator.195 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes 
invalidated a prohibition on extracting sub-surface coal that supported 
surface-level buildings owned by someone other than the owner of the coal 
on the grounds that he did not “see that the fact that [such surface owners’] 
risk has become a danger warrants giving to them greater rights than they 
bought.”196 Viewing separately held mineral rights and surface rights 
together as one denominator would give surface owners greater rights than 
they bought and effectively strip owners of mineral rights of their rights.
While the Murr factors and other recent cases signal that the Court is 
hesitant to buy into the theory of conceptual severance, the factors favor a 
different result in cases involving separately held mineral rights. As 
demonstrated by the preceding analysis, such mineral rights should be 
viewed as a denominator apart from the rest of the tract with which they 
are associated, because holders of these rights do not have the potential for 
alternative uses that owners of surface rights, with or without mineral 
rights, have at their disposal.
Michael Heaton?
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